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IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL: PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS FOR GLOBAL ANTITRUST IN A SYSTEM 
OF NATIONAL LAWS 
 
JENNIFER R. JOHNSON∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As business continues to expand on a multinational level, global 
business organizations increasingly have a need for antitrust law that 
transcends national borders.1 At the same time, States increasingly seek to 
apply their domestic antitrust laws to any company whose practices affect 
their domestic market, whether these companies are foreign or domestic.2 
The issue that results from the combination of these factors, namely what 
to do when both sets of law apply, has been the subject of much academic 
debate. 
The European Union and the United States are the two largest 
economies in the world.3  As such, they provide an excellent model for 
studying the conflicts that arise when two sets of laws apply to the same 
activity, one set of laws domestically and one extraterritorially. 
Unfortunately, the self-interest that motivates antitrust laws nationally 
produces a global antitrust climate that is less than optimal and 
discourages cooperation.4 
Academics and policy makers alike have suggested several 
possible models to ease these multinational tensions. However, each 
                                                 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law, Spring 2003. The author would 
like to thank George J. Alexander for his encouragement, support, and guidance. 
1 See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International 
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 989, 991 (2002). 
2 See id. at 1007. 
3 See Krysztof Kuik, Recent Developments in EU/US Trade Relations, 79 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 433, 434 (2002). 
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model fatally assumes an oversimplified picture of international antitrust, 
proposing overly simplistic solutions. In addition, each fails to recognize 
the role that emerging technology plays in the antitrust landscape. 
This article presents the issues raised by the application of 
domestic laws in an international context through the lens of the two world 
antitrust superpowers, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union 
(EU). Part II reviews the statutory basis for the antitrust laws in both the 
United States and the European Union. Part III discusses the 
extraterritorial application of domestic laws by the United States and the 
European Union and the key differences between the two sets of laws. Part 
IV illustrates the difficulties that arise when domestic laws intersect in a 
global economy. Part V analyzes various proposed solutions to the world 
antitrust problem, demonstrating their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, 
Part VI proposes a new model that, while imperfect, solves several 
problems presented by the previously proposed solutions, integrates 
several aspects of those proposals, and considers the critical role of 
innovation and new technology in the search for a solution. 
 
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ANTITRUST LAW 
A. U.S. Statutory Law 
United States antitrust laws are comprised of a series of statutes 
intended to promote free enterprise and fair competition by preventing 
business activity that results in unreasonable restraints on competition 
such as the formation of monopolies or certain unfair or undesirable 
business practices.5 Several federal statutes cover antitrust issues including 
                                                                                                                         
4 See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U..L. REV. 1501, 
1504 (1998). 
5 See Stuart M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries 
and Intellectual Property in the New Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 
(2002). 
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the Sherman Act,6 the Clayton Act,7 the Robinson-Patnam Act,8 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.9 
Under the Sherman Act, Sections 1 and 2 are the most commonly 
cited. Section 1 prohibits “contract[s], combination[s] . . . [and] 
conspiracy[ies], in restraint of trade or commerce.”10 Section 2 prohibits 
monopolies, “attempt[s] to monopolize, or combinat[ations] or 
conspiracy[ies].”11 Under the Clayton Act, Section 3 prohibits some 
exclusive dealing agreements and refusal to deal agreements.12 Section 7 
prohibits mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures tending to monopoly.13 
Section 1 of the Robinson-Patnam act prohibits price discrimination 
between purchasers.14 Finally, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “to prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations” from “unfair methods of competition” and 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”15 In addition, most states have 
                                                 
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Matthew Bender 2002). Congress added Section 6a to the 
Sherman Act through the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, noting that 
the Sherman Act would not apply to trade with foreign nations unless “such conduct has 
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on internal U.S. trade or 
commerce or U.S. exports to foreign nations giving rise to a claim under the Act. Id. 
 
 
7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27a. 
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 13. 
9 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. 
10 15 U.S.C. § 1. However, in United States v. Standard Oil, the Supreme Court limited 
the literal reading to “unreasonable” restraints on trade for most categories under the 
statute to avoid the potential problems due to the fact that the statute appears on its face 
to prohibit all restraints of trade. See 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). This rule has been termed the 
“rule of reason,” and is contrasted with the stricter standard used for certain categories of 
clear antitrust violations, such as price fixing - “per se” – literally, as a matter of law. See 
Bryan A. Garner, Ed., Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (Pocket Ed. West 1996). (See Case) 
11 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 14. 
13 See id. at § 18. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. at § 45. 
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enacted antitrust, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practice laws 
that are largely consistent with the federal statutes.16 
B. EU Statutory Law 
The European Union is divided into three relevant institutions 
dealing with antitrust regulation.17 The Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (the EC Treaty)18 established the European Commission as 
the executive branch of the Community, which proposes legislation and 
monitors compliance.19 The EC Treaty also established the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), which consists of fifteen judges with jurisdiction 
over such issues as failure to fulfill a treaty obligation and interpretations 
of Community law.20 The third institution is the Court of First Instance 
(CFI), which was created to ease the burden of the ECJ.21 The CFI is also 
made up of fifteen judges, whose focus is upon more complex factual 
situations.22 
The majority of the antitrust law for the European Union can be 
found in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty; treaty law rather than a 
legislative or parliamentary action governs antitrust law in the European 
Union.23 The goal of the EC Treaty is to promote agreements to strengthen 
                                                 
16 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 3. 
17 See Justin O’Dell, Note, Trouble Abroad: Microsoft’s Antitrust Problems Under the 
Law of the European Union, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 119 (2001). 
18 The EC Treaty is also known as the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (Treaty of Rome), Part Three Community Policies, Title VI 
Common Rules on Compensation, Taxation, and Approximation of Laws, Chapter 1 
Rules of Competition, Section 1 Rules Applying to Undertakings, Articles 81 (formerly 
Article 85) and 82 (formerly Article 86) (1997)[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
19 See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 119 (citing Scott M. Kareff, Terta Pak International SA 
v. Commission: The European Approach to Monopoly Leveraging, 28 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 549, 564 (1997)). 
20 See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 119 (citing Kareff, supra note 19, at 565-66). 
21 See id. The ECJ is also the appellate court for the CFI. See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 120 (citing James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 352 (1996)). 
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the Community, thus arrangements that restrict Community commerce or 
maintain economic boundaries between States are restricted or prohibited 
by the EC Treaty.24 Article 81(1) prohibits all agreements between 
undertakings25 that may affect trade between member States, and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of 
competition within the common market.26 Article 81(3) gives the 
Commission the power to exempt individual agreements that may restrict 
competition, but nonetheless serve other important goals of the European 
Community.27 Thus, the two-step inquiry consists of an initial 
determination of whether Article 81(1) applies, followed by an inquiry 
into whether the activity nonetheless is exempted under Article 81(3). 
Article 82 covers unilateral acts of dominant firms, prohibiting various 
abuses of an undertaking’s dominant position if it has an indirect or direct, 
actual or potential effect on trade in the relevant market or markets.28 
 
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 
The United States and the European Union both seek to apply their 
respective domestic antitrust laws to any company whose practices 
“affect” their domestic market, whether that company is foreign or 
                                                 
24 See O’Dell, supra note 17, at 121. 
25 The Treaty of Rome applies to all “undertakings,” Eurospeak for companies or 
business entities. See MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 23 (4th ed. 1997). 
26 See Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61 
ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1992). See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81. The language 
“effect on trade between member states” is defined broadly, requiring only a potential 
effect on trade and allowing agreements between undertakings in the same member state 
to fall under the purview of the Article if they affect competition. See Waller, supra note 
26, at 59 n.21-22 and accompanying text. 
27 See Waller, supra note 26. Parties to agreement can also seek a “negative clearance” 
(formal binding decision that an agreement does not impinge Article 81) or a “comfort 
letter” (informal non-legally-binding notification to ascertain the intentions of the 
Commission). See id. at 61 n.36-38 and accompanying text. 
28 See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 82. For a detailed description of the various 
elements of Article 82, see O’Dell, supra note 17, at 121-28. 
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domestic.29 When such application is to a foreign company, it is termed 
“extraterritorial.”30 While a State’s extraterritorial application of its 
domestic law is often a question of degree, some States are willing and 
able to regulate conduct abroad and some are not.31 
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws 
The first time the United States considered the issue of 
extraterritorial application of its laws was in American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co.,32 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. courts 
had no jurisdiction because the actions at issue occurred abroad.33 More 
specifically, although both the plaintiff and defendant in the case were 
U.S. corporations, the actions at issue took place in Panama and Costa 
Rica.34 Therefore, the Court declared that “the character of an act as lawful 
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where 
the act is done.”35 However, the question of extraterritorial application 
arose again in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),36 with 
a different result. Under the holding of Alcoa, business enterprises with no 
direct connection to the U.S., so long as they had an intended and actual 
effect on the U.S. market, were subject to U.S. jurisdiction.37 This holding 
came to be known as the “intended effects” doctrine. After Alcoa, the 
United States could apply its laws extraterritorially, and was the only 
country in a position to do so at the time.38 
                                                 
29 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1007. 
30 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1506. Likewise, “territoriality” is the situation in which a 
country’s laws apply only to national activity. See id. 
31 See id. at 1508. 
32 213 U.S. 347 (1909). (See Case) 
33 See id. at 358-59. 
34 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1506 (citing 213 U.S. at 356). 
35 213 U.S. at 357. 
36 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). (See Case) 
37 See id. at 443-44. 
38 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1536. 
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The Alcoa doctrine was revised in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America,39 wherein the intended effects analysis was transformed by 
the court into the initial step in the consideration, to be followed by an 
inquiry into international comity40 factors raised by the issue.41 A few 
years later, the U.S. Congress also spoke on the propriety of the Alcoa test 
by enacting the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Act, under which there must 
be a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. 
commerce by the activity at issue to assert U.S. antitrust jurisdiction.42 
Then in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,43 the U.S. Supreme Court 
returned to the comity dialogue, affirming the principles of the 1982 Act.44 
However, the Court also reexamined the Timberlane test, and held that 
comity should only be considered when there is a “true conflict” between 
foreign law and U.S. law.45 As a basis for this holding, the Court cited the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law premise that no conflict exists 
when the laws of two nations can be complied with simultaneously.46 As a 
result, the role of comity in U.S. antitrust law was reduced in favor of a 
                                                 
39 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). (See Case) 
40 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). “[Comity] is the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of 
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” (See Case) 
41 Specifically, the comity factors to consider include: (1) the degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties; (3) the locations or 
principal places of business of the corporations; (4) the extent to which enforcement by 
either state can be expected to achieve compliance; (5) the relative significance of effects 
on the United States as compared to those elsewhere; (6) the extent to which there is 
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; (7) the forseeability of such 
effect; and (8) the relative importance of the violations charged of conduct within the 
United States compared with conduct abroad. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15. 
42 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (Matthew Bender 2002). See also supra note 6. 
43 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 798. 
46 See id. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. e (1987)). 
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stronger emphasis on the domestic antitrust interests of the United 
States.47 
B. Extraterritorial Application of EU Law 
European Union competition laws regulate behavior that “may 
affect trade” between member states or that has “an anticompetitive 
effect” on the European Community market.48 This effect on trade must be 
more than de minimus, and can be direct or indirect, actual or potential.49 
Similar to U.S. law, comity concerns yield to enforcement of EU 
competition laws.50 The European Union addressed the issue directly in 
the “Wood Pulp” decision,51 in which a U.S-based wood pulp 
manufacturer argued that because the association was legal in the United 
States, it should be legal in the European Union as well.52 However, there 
was no requirement in U.S. law that the company, because it was legal in 
the United States., be exempt from EU law.53 The ECJ rejected the 
defendant’s claims, reasoning that the principle of public non-interference 
only applied when the duties of one State were in conflict with those of 
another.54 The European Union further narrowed their consideration of 
international comity in IBM v. EC Commission,55 holding that comity 
should not even be considered until after a decision had been made.56 
                                                 
47 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1011. 
48 See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81(1). 
49 See id. 
50 See generally Joseph P. Griffin, E.C. and the U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and 
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 353, 357 (1994). 
51 See Case 89/85, In Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Commission, 1988 
E.C.R. 5193. 
52 See id. 
53 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1013. 
54 See id. Note the similarity of this test to the American notion of the application of 
principles of comity. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
55 See Case 60/81, IBM v. EC Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639. 
56 See id. 
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Later, in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas57 and GE-Honeywell58 cases, the 
European Union made clear its intention to assert its jurisdiction to 
companies outside of Europe.59 
C. Key Differences Between U.S. and EU Antitrust Law 
In many ways, European Community antitrust powers are lacking 
compared to U.S. enforcement standards.60 Specifically, unlike the U.S. 
Justice Department, the EC does not have the power to split up a company 
that is violating antitrust laws, which may explain its heightened 
stringency against potentially problematic mergers.61 The content of the 
Sherman Act and EC Treaty is different as well. Unlike Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, EC Treaty Article 81(1) contains a partial list of prohibited 
anticompetitive agreement types and reaches concerted conduct not rising 
to the level of Sherman Act contract, combination, or conspiracy.62 Article 
81(3) of the EC Treaty expressly permits the consideration of the kind of 
health, safety, and societal concerns that the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
to fall outside the scope of the rule of reason.63 
In addition, the process under an EC Treaty Article 81 or 82 
analysis is different from that under the Sherman Act. Specifically, under 
                                                 
57 See Commission Begins Investigation of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger, 
Official Press Release of the Eur. Union IP/97/236 (Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, Belg.), Mar. 
19, 1997, at 1. 
58 See EU Commission Prohibits GE’s Acquisition of Honeywell (July 3, 2001), 
available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001052.htm. 
59 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1015. 
60 See Jeffrey M. Peterson, Comment, Unrest in the European Commission: The 
Changing Landscape and Politics of International Mergers for United States Companies, 
24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 377, 400 (2002). 
61 See id. at 400 (citing Anita Raghavan & Brandon Mitchener, U.S. Executives Learn the 
Hard Way About Mario Monti, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 2, 2000, at 1); see also Kuik, 
supra note 3, at 442 (“Their traditionally higher willingness to actively pursue alleged 
competition law violations is justified by the generally limited availability of effective 
private enforcement.”). 
62 See Waller supra note 26, at sect. II, comparing Cooperatieve Verenigning ‘Suiker 
Unie’ UA v. Commission (SUGAR), 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1942 with Theatre Enters v. 
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). 
63 See Waller supra note 26, at n.47 and accompanying text. See also supra note 10. 
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U.S. law which standard applies and whether the conduct is in violation of 
the statute are determined in a one-step process.64 However, under EU 
laws, the Commission and the ECJ would not get to the issue of whether 
an exemption should be allowed under Article 81(3) unless the agreement 
was deemed anticompetitive under Article 81(1).65 
As a result, certain anticompetitive agreements will pass unscathed 
through EU antitrust law that the United States might consider per se 
unreasonable.66 On the other hand, EC Treaty Article 81 provides for 
much stricter treatment of vertical agreements compared to U.S. law.67 
Therefore, European and U.S. antitrust law can come into conflict when 
both sets of law apply, one domestically and one extraterritorially. The 
key differences between the United States and the European Union in 
practice concern application and practices and the extent to which antitrust 
laws should protect competitors from competition.68 The issue of what to 
do when both sets of law apply has been the subject of much academic 
debate. 
 
IV. NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
                                                 
64 See Waller supra note 26, at n. 43-44 and accompanying text. 
65 See id. at n. 45 and accompanying text. 
66 See supra note 10. 
67 See Waller, supra note 26. A further complication in the EU involves the fact that 
individual Member States cannot agree on how much and what authority the EU should 
have. See Peterson, supra note 60, at 408. Although some hope that the structure of the 
United States could be reborn under the EU, this is unlikely because the EU is starting 
from the “opposite direction.” See id. at 408-09 (explaining that the U.S. took settled 
colonies and united them, but the EU is trying to start with separate countries and make 
them cooperate). 
68 See Address by William J. Kolansky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. and E.U. Competition Policy: Cartels, 
Mergers, and Beyond (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.asdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.htm [hereinafter Kolansky Address]. 
Some have argued that sometimes competitors need to be protected not just for their own 
sake, but for the preservation of competition. See id. 
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A National Laws, Multinational Corporations 
As businesses continue to expand into multinational corporations, 
global business organizations increasingly have a need for global 
antitrust.69 This result stems from the very problem that antitrust laws seek 
to solve: antitrust policy is intended to restrain the behavior of 
monopolistic firms to increase the welfare of consumers.70 Because firms 
and consumers are distributed unequally across States, governments do not 
have identical interests.71 Therefore, the United States and the European 
Union have become, globally, the equivalent of the type of monopolies 
that they try to prevent nationally. Under both sets of laws, if either the 
United States or the European Union were corporations, they would 
consider themselves an illegal monopoly.72 However, no global antitrust 
authority exists to prevent either from unfairly using their dominant 
position to increase their power. Further, being the historical world leaders 
in antitrust law, they aren’t likely to want 
to change their position.73 
B. Current U.S.-EU Relations 
The European Union and the United States are the two largest 
economies in the world, jointly account for 50% of the world economy, 
and share the world’s largest bilateral trading and investment 
relationship.74 However, the growing interdependence in EU-U.S. trade 
relations has not been met with equal cooperation.75 Despite this fact, they 
have made steps to ease the tensions between the two sets of laws. 
                                                 
69 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 991. 
70 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1548. 
71 See id. 
72 In fact, the Treaty of Rome was meant to include “States” as well as “undertakings.” 
See EC Treaty, supra note 18, at Article 81(1). 
73 See generally Guzman, supra note 4, at 1507. 
74 See Kuik, supra note 3, at 434. 
75 See id. at 435. 
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The United States and the European Union reached a regional 
agreement in 1991, which aims “to overcome (1) conflicts between 
competition authorities, (2) obstacles to information gathering in foreign 
jurisdictions, and (3) differing rules under which firms must abide.”76  The 
agreement embodies the intention to make the nonbinding 
recommendations by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)77  binding on relations between the United States 
and the European Union; specifically, the recommendations of a negative 
comity clause, a notification clause, and information exchange.78  Yet the 
most “innovative feature” of the U.S.-EU agreement is a “positive comity” 
clause that permits either jurisdiction to request that the other pursue a 
particular case, and imposes a duty to make a good faith decision on 
whether to pursue action.79  In addition, the joint merger working group 
between the United States and the European Union is working to 
“cooperate” and “bring us even closer together.”80  As globalization 
increases and it becomes more difficult for any single antitrust authority to 
enforce its antitrust laws without coordinated information sharing, 
                                                 
76 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1005 (citing Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S./EC 
Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v. Microsoft 
Corp. Window, 2 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 149, 159 (1996)). 
77 The OECD is a multilateral organization that provide the basis for cooperative policies 
between national agencies. See Handler et al., supra note 25, at [46] Recent OECD 
recommendations include notification by one country when an antitrust enforcement 
issue may affect important interests of that country or its nations and cooperative 
consultation to minimize differences. See id. at [47] n.49 and accompanying text (citing 
Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation Between 
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 
OECD Doc. No. c(86)44 (Final) (May 21, 1986)). 
78 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1005 (citing Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding 
the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-Eur. Comm., 30 I.L.M. 
1491, 1491). 
79 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1006. 
80 See Kolansky Address, supra note 68. 
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agreements such as the informationsharing agreements between the United 
States and the European Union are likely to increase.81 
C. Extraterritoriality in Practice: The GE-Honeywell Case 
In the GE-Honeywell case, the parties wanted to combine GE 
(aircraft engine manufacturer) with Honeywell (avionics and other aircraft 
components), arguing that the combined firm could offer a more 
comprehensive range of products to customers. The United States 
accepted this view and approved the merger,82 believing that lower prices 
and an improved portfolio would benefit consumers.83 
However, the European Union prohibited the transaction, fearing 
that the new company would undermine its competitors by use of the same 
advantages the United States applauded.84 As the result of the case, the 
United States gained a strong reaffirmation by the European Commission 
that it shares the ultimate goal of sound competition through focusing on 
consumer welfare, which competition advances through lower prices, 
higher output, and enhanced innovation.85 
The agreement between the United States and the European Union 
detailed above, although helpful to U.S.-EU relations, is merely an 
information sharing agreement, and could not prevent the events that 
transpired in the GE-Honeywellú case. This run-in between U.S. and EU 
antitrust law serves as a stark example of a worldwide problem occurring 
when domestic antitrust laws “overlap.” Academics, commentators, and 
                                                 
81 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 999. 
82 From Reuters, GE Plans to Offer EC Facts in Merger, at B3, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(from Reuters)(May 29, 2001). 
83 See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Evolving Architecture of International Law: The Global 
Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway Regulation?, 26 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 63 (2002). 
84 See id. See also supra note 58. 
85 See Kolansky Address, supra note 68. 
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national agencies have suggested several possibilities to help ease these 
multinational tensions. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Commentators and policy makers have suggested several 
possibilities to help ease the multinational tensions raised by the 
extraterritorial application of domestic laws. As the following will 
demonstrate, these suggestions represent widely divergent views the about 
how to solve the problems currently associated with antitrust on a global 
level. To date, no viable solution has emerged from the debate. In 
addition, each model espouses an oversimplified view of the international 
antitrust structure, and thus proposes overly simplistic solutions. Finally, 
each of these models ignores one aspect of the current world antitrust 
regime that is germane to the success of any proposal. 
A. Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum 
The European Community has proposed that the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) house a global antitrust authority, whose goals would 
include requiring member States to enact and maintain minimal 
competition laws; mandating transparent, nondiscriminatory enforcement; 
providing for cooperation between antitrust authorities; and aiming for the 
gradual convergence of national practices.86 However, commentators 
question the ability of the WTO to accomplish this goal for several 
reasons.87 First, the WTO is a statutory and adjudicatory body designed 
for negotiations and quasi-political-judicial proceedings between member 
States, and is therefore not equipped to police private conduct by 
                                                 
86 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1002 (citing Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in 
Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 478 (2000)). 
87 See id. 
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organizations.88 Second, the fact-intensive case law that has evolved from 
the antitrust statutes is more suited to interpretation by lawyers and judges, 
as such specificity does not exist within the WTO regulations.89 Also, the 
judicial procedures of the WTO are more suited for adjudicating issues 
involving international norms than involving private corporations.90 In 
addition to these difficulties, the WTO and other existing global agencies 
are diplomatic in nature, focusing on advocating policies between States, 
and are thus incompatible with the adjudicative role that would need to be 
played by an international antitrust authority.91 
Another problem with this model is that it assumes that States 
possess equal power, but in actuality States have differing amounts of 
leverage in the global market to impose their views of optimal antitrust on 
others.92 For example, a State’s limited ability may result from a small 
fraction of the foreign business taking place in that State, whereas an 
unlimited regulatory ability may be the result of substantial assets and 
large proportions of business in that State.93  In turn, this power disparity 
produces different opinions about what constitutes optimal levels of 
antitrust.94  Therefore, the only way that those with large amounts of 
antitrust “bargaining power” would be willing to engage in an agreement 
with those with less power is if those States compensate the more 
powerful in some way for the loss they will suffer under the agreement.95  
                                                 
88 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (citing Tarullo, supra note 86, at 483-89). 
89 See Sugden, supra note 1, 1003. 
90 See id. Similarly, the OECD is ill-equipped to adjudicate global antitrust issues, as it is 
inherently cooperative, whereas enforcement is inherently adversarial. See id. at 1004. 
91 See id. 
92 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 996 (citing Guzman, supra note 4, at 1528-29). 
93 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1506-07. 
94 See id. 
95 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1527. 
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Unfortunately, the States that would need to make such payment are 
unlikely to have the resources to do so.96 
The European Community’s suggestion is that member States of 
the WTO agree on a competition “code” that will be binding on those 
States.97 Disagreement over what that code might contain aside, this 
concept would likely fail to gain worldwide acceptance, based upon a 
more well-known, lengthy, historical, and heretofore failed attempt to 
subject all States to mandatory adjudication of issues – the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).98 In fact, one commentator called further efforts to 
develop a global antitrust authority “a fruitless waste of time.”99 The 
United States has also directly rejected this concept.100 
Finally, agreements that address enforcement and require 
minimum standards are likely to be difficult to negotiate or enforce.101 
This is so because some States have difficulty enforcing their own laws, as 
exemplified in the United States, due to antitrust enforcement through 
private parties, states, and various federal agencies, as well as state 
authority to create exceptions from federal compliance.102 
                                                 
96 See id. This is one reason that this commentator advocates the multi-subject negotiation 
model. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43. 
97 See Peterson, supra note 60, at 406. 
98 The United States has been one of the few hold outs to the “World Court.” Ironically, 
the concept of the World Court has been deemed the “American plan” because the idea 
was the result of a peaceful arbitration between the U.S. and the English over the attacks 
by the English ship called The Alabama and many of the ideas for the structure and 
function of the Court were based upon the U.S. Supreme Court, which had successfully 
(save the Civil War) settled the differences of the thirteen original, independent colonies. 
Jennifer Johnson & Ami Mudd De Celle, Book Review, The World Court in Action: 
Judging Among the Nations by Howard N. Meyer, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2003). 
99 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1017. 
100 See Peterson, supra note 60, at 406; see also supra note 98 (mirroring the attitude of 
the U.S. concerning the World Court). 
101 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1541. 
102 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1541 n.124-125 (citing Joseph P. Griffin, United States 
Antitrust Laws and Transnational Business Transactions: An Introduction, 21 INT'L LAW. 
307, 312-14 (1987) (describing federal, state, and private antitrust enforcement 
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B. Continued Bilateral Agreements and Strengthening Extraterritorial 
Application 
On the flip side, those who see an international antitrust authority 
as an idealistic, albeit unrealistic, goal suggest measures more in keeping 
with the current trend.103 One student commentator has suggested two 
potential remedies: (1) continued development of bilateral agreements; 
and (2) continued and strengthening extraterritorial application of 
domestic antitrust laws.104 He cites the U.S.-EU resolution of the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas case as an example of why this system is likely to be 
successful.105 In the case, a merger that the United States deemed to be 
permissible was held to be against the antitrust interests of the European 
Union.106 The United States and the European Union eventually found 
terms that both could agree upon.107 Therefore, the premise of this 
argument is that both U.S. and EU antitrust laws evolved as a result of 
extraterritorial enforcement, causing the two sets of laws to converge.108 
However, other commentators have questioned “whether the 
existing model of . . . separate laws in each jurisdiction . . . [with] each 
[jurisdiction] proceeding according to its own rules and agendas, subject 
to coordination with other jurisdictions only at the margins – is viable.”109 
In fact, some believe that following our current system to its logical 
conclusion means that it is only a matter of time before the type of 
                                                                                                                         
procedures) and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (granting California right to 
control its domestic industries even though doing so might affect interstate commerce)). 
103 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1017-20. 
104 See id. at 1017-18. 
105 See id. at 1018. 
106 See id. See also supra note 57. 
107 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 1018. 
108 See id. at 1019. 
109 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 65. 
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standoffs seen in the GE-Honeywell case110 are common in international 
economic and diplomatic relations.111 
In addition, the effect of any bilateral or multilateral agreements 
needs to be considered, not just their likelihood.112 For example, an 
agreement between two States, such as the United States and European 
Union, is likely to occur because both entities are pursuing a similar policy 
independently.113 For agreements between several States, the cooperation 
is likely to favor the welfare of the negotiating parties, and this result may 
not coincide with global welfare because only a small subset of the world 
participates.114  In his discussion of positive comity, one commentator 
noted that while enforcement authorities in such agreements are not 
obligated to take action, they are expected “to investigate and make a good 
faith enforcement decision on the basis of its competition law and not on 
the basis of the nationality of the alleged victim or respondent.”115  
However, other commentators have spent intensive amounts of energy on 
methods that assume that this model is naïve. For example, one 
commentator who focuses on the economic model starts with the 
assumption that, due to national interests, States are unlikely to pursue the 
most optimal level of global regulation.116 
An example can be seen through the U.S. exemption for export 
cartels. The U.S. Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918117  exempts from the reach 
                                                 
110 See supra note 58. 
111 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 66. The commentator that made this statement believes 
that these standoffs will be on a smaller scale, but that the prerogatives of antitrust 
enforcers will be pushed beyond acceptable limits. See id. 
112 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1526. 
113 See id. at 1525. 
114 See id. at 1526. 
115 See Spencer Weber Waller, Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Open International 
Markets?, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 230 (2000)(emphasis added). 
116 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1504 for an excellent, extensive analysis under the 
economic model. 
117 See Pub. L. No. 65-126, 40 Stat. 516 (1918) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16-66 (1994)). 
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of the Sherman Act trade associations formed “for the sole purpose of 
engaging in export trade.”118  The theory behind this exemption, from a 
national perspective, is that as long as the welfare loss from 
anticompetitive activities is largely or wholly borne by foreign consumers, 
the optimal antitrust policy is no policy at all.119  These types of 
exemptions allow exporters to engage in behavior that would be prohibited 
if it occurred within the country.120 
In short, this proposal suggests that we let the system work itself 
out, largely continuing down the road we are currently taking. However, 
William J. Kolansky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has stated that that division of 
our government itself is against the idea of just ‘leaving things be’: “What 
is needed therefore is not that we stop talking about these important issues, 
but that we move beyond talking and begin taking steps to address 
them.”121 
C. The International Competition Network (ICN) 
In October 2001, the antitrust authorities of thirteen States came 
together to form the International Competition Network (ICN), which is 
the only multilateral government organization to discuss “all competition, 
all the time.”122 It is uniquely independent of other agendas pursued by 
international organizations.123 As of Fall 2002, a total of fifty-six 
authorities have joined.124 Premised on the understanding that “sound 
                                                 
118 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1533 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 62). 
119 See id. at 1514. 
120 See id. at 1534. 
121 Kolansky Address, supra note 68. 
122 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 65. 
123 See id. Such agendas include issues such as trade and development, often discussed 
along with competition issues. However, some argue that discussion of competition in 
isolation will hinder, not help, the progress of global antitrust. See also infra notes 141-43 
and accompanying text. 
124 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 65. 
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antitrust enforcement requires a deep and shared ‘culture of competition,’” 
the first step for the ICN is understanding each other’s law, institutions, 
and economic principles.125 William Kolansky was recently quoted as 
saying about the ICN: 
“The goal of the ICN was twofold. First, to provide support 
for new competition agencies both in enforcing their laws 
and in building a strong competition culture in their 
countries. Second, to promote greater convergence among 
these authorities around sound competition principles by 
working together and with stakeholders in the private 
sector, to develop best practice recommendations for 
antitrust enforcement and competition advocacy that could 
then be implemented voluntarily by the member 
agencies.”126 
 
However, the world already has an agency to recommend 
voluntary guidelines that States can choose to follow at their discretion.127 
In addition, ineffectiveness resulting from the non-compulsory nature of 
the early World Court can again serve as an example of why such a system 
is unlikely to bring any significant change. The original Court was “an 
international dispute resolution body, but it left arbitration by the Court a 
voluntary matter, and left the U.S. Senate free to veto U.S. participation in 
individual cases.”128 As history illustrates, recommendations are not likely 
to be universally adopted if States are free to follow them or not as they 
see fit. 
                                                 
125 See Kolansky Address, supra note 68. 
126 See DOJ Official Discusses ICN Before IBA Competition Conference, BNA Vol. 83, 
No. 2075 (Sept. 27, 2002)(Antitrust and Trade Regulation)(emphasis added). 
127 That agency is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See 
also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
128 See Johnson and DeCelle, supra note 98. 
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D. The Leadership Model 
One commentator suggests that a new paradigm “leadership 
model” may emerge out of the current global antitrust chaos.129 Such a 
model would include the largest industrialized States attempting to adopt a 
common enforcement approach and asking other jurisdictions to follow.130 
However, he questions whether developing States will simply defer to the 
rule of the most successful jurisdictions.131 By contrast, another 
commentator suggests that developing States already defer to the most 
successful jurisdictions.132 In addition, the problem of a small group of 
States tending to their domestic economies rather than acting upon 
recognition of globally optimal conditions discussed under the bilateral 
agreement/extraterritorial application model applies here as well.133 
E. The Expert Negotiation-Government Implementation Model 
Recognizing that legal reform requires legislation, some have 
acknowledged the success of experts working together to propose uniform 
law instead of direct negotiations between governments.134 Looking to the 
National Conference of Commissions of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
as its model, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is a clear example of 
the success of this method on the national level.135 The NCCUSL is a non-
profit group formed in 1897 in response to the perceived need for uniform 
state law approaches to U.S. commerce, and consisted of expert 
commissioners, including private legal practitioners, law professors, 
                                                 
129 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 66. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1524. In a world with extraterritoriality, “the toughest 
law is the binding law because ... that country can prevent the activity through 
extraterritorial application of its laws.” See id. 
133 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
134 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 67. 
135 See id. 
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judges, and legislators.136 This “expert negotiation-government adoption” 
model could be translated to international antitrust issues.137 
An example of this model currently in practice can be seen in the 
joint merger working group between the United States and the European 
Union.138 The group is comprised of twenty U.S. attorneys and 
economists, and similar members from the European Union working 
together to examine issues germane to antitrust law and discuss 
cooperation.139 In addition, the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice, in conducting a thorough review of where they can improve, 
convened a roundtable last November consisting of the senior in-house 
counsel of various large U.S. companies for their input on how to improve 
in the area of merger review.140  
However, one commentator predicts that single-topic negotiations 
are unlikely to lead to an agreement.141 He suggests that negotiations of 
unrelated issues should take place simultaneous with those of antitrust 
issues.142 Despite the fact that this makes negotiations more complex, it 
also puts other issues “on the table,” allowing potential ‘losers’ in the 
antitrust bargain other areas and benefits with which to bargain, making 
agreement more likely.143 
In addition, the successes of the U.C.C. and joint merger working 
group may be lesser accomplishments than they appear. When the U.C.C. 
was adopted, it was largely a revision of existing laws. The joint merger 
working group, while discussing cooperation between the United States 
                                                 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Kolansky Address, supra note 68. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Guzman, supra note 4, at 1545. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. at 1545-46. 
Vol. 1 [2003] PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR GLOBAL ANTITRUST 140 
 Jennifer Johnson 
and the European Union, is working with the laws of two States with 
roughly the same resources and the same goals. It would be naïve to think 
that such cooperation could be as easily achieved between two (or more) 
less similar States. 
F. The Oversimplification Problem 
One problem with each of the proposed solutions above is that they 
assume an oversimplified international antitrust context. For example, the 
global antitrust authority model assumes that States of varying levels of 
antitrust enforcement, economic resources, and international clout will 
drop their self-interest in favor of internationally optimal conditions.144 
The bilateral agreement-extraterritorial application model takes this into 
consideration, but therefore sees global cooperation in any form as 
untenable.145 A viable solution lies somewhere between these two views. 
The ICN model recognizes the problem of mandatory adjudication under 
the global antitrust authority model, but its proposed alternative, voluntary 
implementation,146 is likely to be just as ineffective. Likewise, the expert 
negotiation-government implementation model recognizes that self-
interest may prevent governments from working together effectively, but 
fails to recognize that States hold unequal bargaining power,147 and thus, 
some countries may not have anything to bargain with. In addition, each 
model fails to recognize the role of emerging technologies in the global 
antitrust landscape, ignoring an important element of any viable 
solution.148 In short, the issue of global antitrust regulation is complex, and 
thus is unlikely to be solved by a simplistic model. 
                                                 
144 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra text accompanying note 103. 
146 See supra text accompanying note 126. 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. 
148 One commentator suggests that innovation and new technology serves a “critical role” 
in antitrust rule formulation, and is “by far the most important source of long-run 
productivity growth.” See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 67. 
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VI. PROPOSAL 
In considering a new model, one should not discard prior 
incomplete ideas that have fractional utility. Instead, any new proposal 
should take full advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of the models 
that have come before it. To begin with, the model for building viable 
global antitrust regime should begin with what appears to be most 
successful – the expert negotiation-government implementation model. 
This proposal, while imperfect, cures some of the deficiencies of its 
predecessors, taking a step toward a truly workable international system. 
As seen through the successes of the U.C.C. and the joint merger working 
group of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division,149 this model begins 
with a structure designed by those who are experts in their respective 
fields. On the multinational level, this group would certainly include 
participants from several different nationalities, but would not necessarily 
include experts in international or comparative law. Instead, experts in 
domestic antitrust law, economists, corporate attorneys, and those versed 
in emerging technologies and intellectual property transactions would 
better serve the purpose of designing a system for the future of global 
commerce. A panel of experts in their respective fields solves two 
problems raised by the Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum model. First, 
experts can rely on their experience to include specificity in the norms and 
standards that result from the group, an aspect lacking in previous 
multinational regulations.150 Second, by including in the group those 
involved in business and economics, the standards that result from the 
group are more likely to be applicable to private companies in addition to 
States, something that the global antitrust authority proposed by the 
                                                 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 135-38. 
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European Community would not be able to do.151 In this way, the use of 
experts as the core of this model brings it closer to the goal of international 
cooperation. 
In forming this group, cooperation will need to move beyond 
bilateral agreements to the multilateral arena.152 Having said this, 
however, a group with representatives from all States is unlikely to reach 
any resolution efficiently. Therefore, the number of nationalities to include 
must be somewhere between two (total) and one per member State. This 
model proposes that a group of four to eight nationalities would be ideal. 
This number is large enough to overcome the weaknesses of ineffective, 
uncompromising bilateral agreements, yet small enough to find common 
ground. In addition, a group this size is large enough and diverse enough 
to include probable “leaders” for a large number of States. Therefore, 
when States become part of the group, each can follow the model of the 
founding State that is most similar to their own. This group will be 
referred to as the “founding group.” A group of this size solves two 
problems raised by the Bilateral Agreement model. First, it reduces the 
number of standoffs that result from States’ attempts to proceed according 
to their respective domestic laws and coordinating only when essential.153 
Second, the group is small enough to be able to find some common 
ground, yet large enough for that ground to be more internationally 
optimal than if each country simply protected its own interests.154 Thus the 
size of the group proposed by this model makes realistic international 
cooperation more likely. 
                                                                                                                         
150 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 89. 
151 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 112-114. 
153 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 114 and 116 and accompanying text. 
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Emerging technology may be the key to the success of this model, 
as it often serves as an accurate predictor of where commerce is going.155 
In addition, the inherent tension between intellectual property-imposed 
‘monopolies’ and antitrust law requires that any new scheme consider 
intellectual property issues if it is to achieve long-term success.156 
However, the inclusion of technology also further complicates the 
discussion. Nonetheless, the incidence and extent of Internet involvement 
in business transactions have brought society to a point in history where 
technology considerations cannot be ignored, regardless of how they 
confuse the issue. 
Once the founding group is formed, it could serve as the 
“leadership” that other jurisdictions could eventually be asked to follow.157 
To overcome the issues associated with forming an organization of the 
most powerful jurisdictions and simply asking the rest to comply, the 
member States of this group should vary in size and bargaining power. 
Because the United States and the European Union are the “experts” in 
antitrust thus far in global history, they should both be included.158 
However, the remaining members of the group should include States with 
less developed antitrust enforcement regimes and those with none 
currently in place. This structure would open up dialogue addressing 
respective concerns that the diverse groups have concerning their dealings 
with the States with systems unlike their own.  
States and corporations will not have models to follow without 
initial government and corporate buy-in by those represented by the 
founding group. Thus, the governments of the States that opt to be part of 
                                                 
155 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 67. See also supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
156 See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 67. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 129-33. 
158 While the European Union is not a “State,” I will treat it as one for the purposes of this 
discussion, as it has its own body of cohesive antitrust law. 
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the founding group will need to commit to a sincere effort to adopt the 
norms and standards that the group produces. Therefore, the 
representatives of each State should understand the State’s domestic goals. 
In addition, the group should include representatives from at least one 
large corporation, or at a minimum, a State whose “economy” functions 
much like a traditional corporation. In so doing, corporations as well as 
States will have a model for smoother international relations. This 
proposal envisions a system similar to that of the Good Housekeeping 
Institute’s seal of approval.159 Moreover, when a State or corporation 
adopts the norms and standards produced by the founding group, they 
would be able to advertise as such, attracting others who support those 
standards. At the very least, the founding group work product will be a set 
of minimal standards that can assist States that currently have little or no 
established antitrust law. This aspect of the model also solves the optional 
compulsory tension implicit between earlier proposals.160 Since founding 
group members will opt to be bound (compulsory), while non-founding 
members can later join by following these models (a non-compulsory), the 
group begins with a foundation that, if successful, is likely to expand. 
Although it will introduce exponential complexity into the 
bargaining, multi-topic negotiations should be the group’s goal. In so 
doing, States with relatively little bargaining power in the antitrust area 
may be able to cross-negotiate in exchange for concessions in an area in 
                                                 
159 The Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval is an assurance on products that they 
comply with certain quality standards. See Good Housekeeping, Good Housekeeping 
Institute Standards for Certification of Advertiser Websites, at 
http://www.ghcertificate.com/prog_info.html (2000). Here, States and companies could 
similarly use a symbol to indicate that its practices have been approved by the 
organization formed by the founding group. 
160 Compare supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text with supra notes 127-28 and 
accompanying text. In short, a binding standard is unlikely to be adopted, yet a non-
compulsory standard may prove useless. 
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which they have more “clout.”161 One area to consider is emerging 
technology. In addition to being indicative of future commerce, exchange 
of assets is commonplace in the intellectual property context. 
Crosslicenses are commonplace between corporations in competition with 
each other, and can serve as a model for efficient exchange that enhances 
and strengthens all participants. However, it is likely that the same States 
that have antitrust bargaining power may have technology bargaining 
power. The founding group should consider other areas of negotiation, 
such as raw materials only available in States that lack technological 
resources. This aspect of the model eliminates two barriers raised by the 
Global Antitrust Adjudication Forum model. First, it reflects the reality 
that States do not have equal bargaining power, and thus may not agree as 
to what level of international antitrust cooperation is “optimal.”162 Second, 
because States that have lower bargaining power in antitrust issues will be 
able to leverage their potential in other areas, the resulting standards are 
more likely to address their needs. Through this model, participating 
States have the incentive of accruing national benefits in at least one 
negotiated area while promoting global antitrust norms that are more 
optimal internationally, thereby increasing the likelihood that such 
negotiations will be successful. 
While this proposal does not cure the myriad problems inherent in 
earlier proposals, it takes some clear steps toward a realistic system by 
eliminating some of the barriers thereto. Constructing an international 
antitrust system out of a complex of competing national laws is a delicate 
and exhaustive undertaking, as the shortcomings of former proposals, and 
the limitations of this model illustrate.163 However, as this model has built 
                                                 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 141-43. 
162 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
163 I am indebted to George J. Alexander for this insight and commentary. 
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on those provided by others; perhaps later models will also expand upon 
it. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As global business expands, so does the need for antitrust law that 
transcends national borders.164 As a result, extraterritorial application of 
domestic laws has come under increased scrutiny.165 The European Union 
and the United States, the two largest economies in the world, provide an 
excellent model for studying the effect of the conflicts that arise in such 
contexts. Although many academics have proposed several models of 
change, each model assumes an oversimplified problem and proposes an 
oversimplified solution, as well as fails to recognize the role that emerging 
technology plays in the antitrust landscape. 
The new proposal takes advantage of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the models that have come before it, combining the best aspects of the 
expert negotiation-government implementation and leadership models, 
and adding multi-topic negotiations and emerging technology to create a 
small, but diverse founding group to serve as its foundation. While 
imperfect, this structure is large enough to overcome the weaknesses of 
ineffective, uncompromising bilateral agreements, yet small enough to 
find a common ground and serve as the leadership that other jurisdictions 
could eventually be asked to follow, mimicking the model of the founding 
State that is most similar to their own. In addition, this model makes the 
connection between theory and practice by advocating governmental and 
corporate buy-in. By providing national incentives to all participants, this 
model is a positive step toward achieving global cooperation. 
                                                 
164 See Sugden, supra note 1, at 991. 
165 See id. at 1007. 
 
